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Abstract
In 1974, Ralph Merkle proposed the first unclassified scheme for secure communications over
insecure channels. When legitimate communicating parties are willing to spend an amount of
computational effort proportional to some parameterN , an eavesdropper cannot break into their
communication without spending a time proportional to N2, which is quadratically more than
the legitimate effort. Two of us showed in 2008 that Merkle’s schemes are completely insecure
against a quantum adversary, but that their security can be partially restored if the legitimate
parties are also allowed to use quantum computation: the eavesdropper needed to spend a
time proportional to N3/2 to break our earlier quantum scheme. Furthermore, all previous
classical schemes could be broken completely by the onslaught of a quantum eavesdropper and
we conjectured that this is unavoidable.
We give now two novel key establishment schemes in the spirit of Merkle’s. The first one
can be broken by a quantum adversary who makes an effort proportional to N5/3, which is the
optimal attack against this scheme. Our second scheme is purely classical, yet it cannot be
broken by a quantum eavesdropper who is only willing to expend an effort proportional to that
of the legitimate parties.
We then introduce two families of more elaborate protocols. The first family consists in
quantum protocols whose security is arbitrarily close to quadratic in the query complexity
model. The second is a family of classical protocols whose security against a quantum adversary
is arbitrarily close to N3/2 in the same model.
Keywords: Merkle Puzzles, Key Establishment, Quantum Cryptography.
∗A preliminary version of this paper appeared in the Proceedings of Crypto 2011, Phil Rogaway (editor).
1 Introduction
While Ralph Merkle was delivering the 2005 International Association for Cryptologic Research
(IACR) Distinguished Lecture at the Crypto annual conference in Santa Barbara, describing his
original unpublished 1974 scheme [17] for public key establishment (much simpler and more elegant
than his subsequently published, yet better known, Merkle Puzzles [18]), one of us (Brassard)
immediately realized that this scheme was totally insecure against an eavesdropper equipped with a
quantum computer. The obvious question was: can Merkle’s idea be repaired and made secure again
in our quantum world? The defining characteristics of Merkle’s protocol are that (1) the legitimate
parties communicate strictly through an authenticated classical channel on which eavesdropping is
unrestricted and (2) a protocol is deemed to be secure if the cryptanalytic effort required of the
eavesdropper to learn the key established by the legitimate parties grows super-linearly with the
legitimate work.
Two of us (Brassard and Salvail [9]) partially repaired Merkle’s idea in 2008 with a scheme
in which the eavesdropper needs an amount of work in Ω
(
N3/2
)
to obtain the key established
by quantum legitimate parties whose amount of work is in O(N). This was not quite as good
as the work in Ω(N2) required by a classical eavesdropper against Merkle’s original scheme, but
significantly better than the work in O(N) sufficient for a quantum eavesdropper against the same
scheme. Two main questions were left open in Ref. [9]:
1. Can the quadratic security possible in a classical world be restored in our quantum world?
2. Is any security possible at all if the legitimate parties are purely classical, yet the eavesdropper
is endowed with a quantum computer?
We give two novel key establishment protocols to address these issues. In the first protocol, the
legitimate parties use quantum computers and classical authenticated communication to establish a
shared key after O(N) expected queries to two black-box random functions (which can be modelled
with a single binary random oracle). We then give a nontrivial quantum cryptanalytic attack that
uses a quantum walk in a Hamming graph, which enables a quantum eavesdropper to learn the
key after Θ
(
N5/3
)
queries to the functions. Finally, we prove that our attack is optimal up to
logarithmic factors.
Second, we give a purely classical protocol, in which the legitimate parties use classical commu-
nication and classical computation to establish a key after O(N) calls to similar black-box random
functions. We then attack this protocol with a quantum cryptanalytic algorithm that uses Θ
(
N7/6
)
queries to the functions. As unlikely as it may sound, this attack is optimal (up to logarithmic
factors) and therefore it is not possible to break this purely classical protocol with a quantum attack
that uses an amount of resource linear in the legitimate effort.
Finally, we present two families of protocols extending the ideas presented in the previous
sections. The first one is a family of quantum protocols whose security is arbitrarily close to
quadratic. However, we do not know how to make these protocols time-efficient, except for the
first two in the family. Our best protocol requires the eavesdropper’s effort to be Ω
(
N7/4
)
in the
legitimate parties’ amount of work. The second is a family of classical protocol whose security is
arbitrarily close to N3/2. This time, however, we only know how to make time-efficient the first
protocol of the family, which is in fact none other than the one mentioned in the previous paragraph.
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After a review of Merkle’s original idea, its meltdown against a quantum eavesdropper and our
earlier partial quantum solution (Section 2), we describe our new protocols (Sections 3 and 4),
quantum attacks against them (Sections 3.1 and 4.1) and proofs of optimality for those attacks
(Sections 3.2 and 4.2). We then extend these protocols in two families of more elaborate quantum
and classical protocols (Section 5). The time complexity of our protocols is analysed in Section 6.
As a technical tool needed in our proofs of lower bounds, we prove a new composition theorem
of potential independent interest in Section 7. Finally, we conclude in Section 8 with conjectures
about the existence of even better schemes.
2 Merkle’s Original Scheme and How to Break and Partially
Repair It with Quantum Computers
The first unclassified document ever written that pioneered public key establishment and public
key cryptography was a project proposal written in 1974 by Merkle when he was a student in
Lance Hoffman’s CS244 course on Computer Security at the University of California, Berkeley [17].
Hoffman rejected the proposal and Merkle dropped the course but “kept working on the idea” and
eventually published it as one of the most seminal cryptographic papers in the second half of the
twentieth century [18]. Merkle’s scheme in his published paper was somewhat different from his
original 1974 idea, but both share the property that they “force any enemy to expend an amount of
work which increases as the square of the work required of the two [legitimate] communicants” [18].
It took 35 years before Boaz Barak and Mohammad Mahmoody-Ghidary proved that this quadratic
discrepancy between the legitimate and eavesdropping efforts are the best possible in a classical
world [2].
In his IACR Distinguished Lecture 1, which he delivered at the Crypto ’05 Conference in Santa
Barbara, Merkle described from memory his first solution to the problem of secure communications
over insecure channels. As a wondrous coincidence, he unsuspectingly opened up a box of old folders
a mere three weeks after his Lecture and happily recovered his long-lost CS244 Project Proposal,
together with comments handwritten by Hoffman [17]! To quote his original typewritten words:
Method 1: Guessing. Both sites guess at keywords. These
guesses are one-way encrypted, and transmitted to the
other site. If both sites should chance to guess at
the same keyword, this fact will be discovered when
the encrypted versions are compared, and this keyword
will then be used to establish a communications link.
Discussion: No, I am not joking.
In more modern terms, let f be a one-way permutation. In order to “one-way encrypt” x, as
Merkle wrote in 1974, we assume that one can compute f(x) in unit time for any given input x
but that the only way to retrieve x given f(x) is to try preimages and compute f on them until
one is found that maps to f(x). This is known as the black box (or oracle) model. Accordingly,
throughout this paper, with the exception of Section 6, efficiency is defined solely in terms of the
1 www.iacr.org/publications/dl/ann2005.html.
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number of calls to such black-box functions (there could be more than one). In the quantum case,
these calls can be made in a superposition of inputs. We also assume throughout this paper (as did
Merkle) that an authenticated channel is available between the legitimate communicants, although
this channel offers no protection against eavesdropping.
The “keywords” guessed at by “both sites” are random points in the domain of f. They are
“one-way encrypted” by applying f to them. If there are N2 points in the domain of f, it suffices to
guess O(N) keywords at each site before it becomes overwhelmingly likely that “both sites should
chance to guess at the same keyword”, which becomes their shared key. An eavesdropper who
listens to the entire conversation has no other way to obtain this key than to invert f on the
revealed common encrypted keyword. In accordance with the black-box model, this can only be
done by trying on the average half the points in the domain of f before one is found that is mapped
by f to the target value. This will require an expected number of calls to f in Ω(N2), which is
quadratic in the legitimate effort.
Shortly thereafter, Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman discovered a celebrated method for
public-key establishment that makes the cryptanalytic effort apparently exponentially harder than
the legitimate effort [12]. However, no proof is known that the Diffie-Hellman scheme is secure
at all since it relies on the conjectured difficulty of extracting discrete logarithms, an assumption
doomed to fail whenever quantum computers become available [20]. In contrast, Merkle’s approach
offers provable quadratic security against any possible classical attack, under the sole assumption
that f cannot be inverted by any other means than exhaustive search.
Next, we explain why Merkle’s original proposal becomes completely insecure if the eavesdropper
is capable of quantum computation (Merkle’s published “puzzles” [18] are equally insecure [9]).
We then sketch our earlier solution for a protocol that is not completely broken [9]. This is achieved
by granting similar quantum computation capabilities to one of the legitimate communicating
parties.
2.1 Quantum Attack and Partial Remedy
Let us now assume that function f can be computed quantum mechanically on a superposition
of inputs. In this case, Merkle’s original scheme is completely compromised by way of Grover’s
algorithm [13]. Indeed, this algorithm needs only O
(√
N2
)
= O(N) calls on f in order to invert it
on any given point of its image, making the cryptanalytic task as easy (up to constant factors) as
the legitimate key set-up process. 2
To remedy the situation, we allow the communicating parties to use quantum computers as
well (actually, one of the parties will remain classical), and we increase the domain of f from N2
to N3 points. Instead of having both sites transmit one-way encrypted guesses to the other site,
one site called Alice chooses N distinct random values x1, x2, . . . , xN and transmits them, one-way
encrypted by the application of f, to the other site called Bob. Let Y = {f(xi) | 1 6 i 6 N} denote
2 If an unstructured search problem has t solutions amongM candidates, Grover’s algorithm [13], or more precisely
its so-called BBHT generalization [6], can find one of the solutions after O
(√
M/t
)
expected calls to a function that
recognizes solutions among candidates. However, Theorem 4 of Ref. [7] implies that, whenever the number t > 0 is
known, a solution can be found with certainty after O
(√
M/t
)
calls to that function in the worst case. From now
on, when we mention Grover’s algorithm or BBHT, we really mean this improvement according to Ref. [7].
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the set of encrypted keywords received by Bob, which becomes known to the eavesdropper. Now,
Bob defines Boolean function g on the same domain as f by
g(x) =
{
1 if f(x) ∈ Y
0 otherwise.
Out of N3 points in the domain of f, there are exactly t = N solutions to the problem of
finding an x so that g(x) = 1. It suffices for Bob to apply the BBHT generalization [6] of Grover’s
algorithm [13], which finds such an x after O
(√
N3/t
)
= O
(√
N2
)
= O(N) calls on g (and therefore
on f). Bob sends back f(x) to Alice, who knows the value of x because she was careful to keep her
randomly chosen points. Therefore, it suffices of O(N) calls 3 on f by Alice and Bob for them to
agree on key x.
The eavesdropper, on the other hand, is faced again with the need to invert f on a specific point
of its image. Even with a quantum computer, this requires a number of calls on f proportional to
the square root of the number of points in its domain [5], which is Ω
(√
N3
)
= Ω
(
N3/2
)
. This is
more effort than what is required of the legitimate parties, yet less than quadratically so, as would
have been possible in a classical world. Even though we have avoided the meltdown of Merkle’s
original approach, the introduction of quantum computers available to all sides seems to be to
the advantage of the codebreakers. Can we remedy this situation? Furthermore, is any security
possible at all against a quantum computer if both legitimate parties are restricted to being purely
classical? We address these two questions in the rest of this paper.
3 Improved Quantum Key Establishment Scheme
The adjective negligible describes any function that decreases faster than the inverse of any poly-
nomial. Formally, a function ν : N → R is negligible if for any constant k, there exists Nk such
that for all N > Nk, we have ν(N) < N
−k. This definition is meaningful in the standard model
of cryptography (without oracle), in which the desired level of security is at least sub-exponential.
However, the security level in our context (oracle model) can be polynomial at best. Therefore,
we must be satisfied if the adversary is only able to break the protocol with vanishing probability.
A function ν : N → R is vanishing if for any integer k, there exists Nk such that for all N > Nk,
we have ν(N) < 1/k, or said otherwise if ν is o(1).
For any positive integer N , let [N ] denote the set of integers from 1 to N . We describe
our novel key establishment protocol assuming the existence of two black-box random functions
f : [N3]→ [N c] and t : [N3]→ [N c′ ] that can be accessed in quantum superposition of inputs. Con-
stant c is chosen large enough so that f is one-to-one (there is no collision in the images of f), except
with vanishing probability. A calculation reminiscent of the birthday paradox shows that choosing
c > 6 is sufficient. For simplicity, we shall disregard the possibility that f is not one-to-one.
The constant c′ is chosen large enough to ensure that, except with vanishing probability, the
function that maps unordered pairs {a, b} of distinct elements to t(a) ⊕ t(b) is one-to-one, where
3 If we cared about computational efficiency instead of only query complexity, Bob would sort the elements of Y in
increasing order after receiving them from Alice. In this way, he can quickly determine, given any y = f(x), whether
or not y ∈ Y, which is needed to compute function g. More on computational efficiency in Section 6.
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“⊕ ” denotes the bitwise exclusive-or of bit strings identified to integers. 4 A similar calculation,
using the fact that ⊕ maps uniformly distributed inputs to uniformly distributed outputs, can be
used to show that c′ > 12 is sufficient. Again, we shall systematically assume that this property
holds.
Notice that a single binary random oracle (which “implements” a random function from the
integers to {0, 1}) could be used to define both functions f and t, provided we disregard logarithmic
factors in our analyses, since O(logN) calls to the random binary oracle would suffice to compute f
or t on any given input. Indeed, to specify function f using a binary oracle, one needs only N3 lgN c
bits from the binary oracle, where “ lg ” denotes the binary logarithm, since each query i ∈ [N3] for
f requires lgN c queries to the binary oracle to construct the integer f(i) ∈ [N c]. The situation is
similar for function t. For this reason, it is understood hereinafter that all our results are implicitly
stated “up to logarithmic factors”. Furthermore, multiple function oracles can be encoded using a
single binary oracle by pre-pending a fixed bit string to the beginning of each query. For instance,
queries of the form “ 0x ” and “ 1x ” can be used to define functions f and t, respectively.
As mentioned in the previous section, the only resource that we consider in our analyses of
efficiency and lower bounds, except in Section 6, is the number of calls made to these functions or,
equivalently up to logarithmic factors, to the underlying binary random oracle.
Protocol 1 (Quantum vs quantum).
1. Alice picks at random N distinct points x1, x2, . . . , xN in the domain of f and transmits
their encrypted values yi = f(xi) to Bob. Let X = {xi | 1 6 i 6 N} be the secret set of Alice
and define Y = {yi | 1 6 i 6 N}. Note that Alice knows both X and Y, whereas Bob and the
eavesdropper know only Y until they make their own queries to the black-box function f .
2. Bob finds the pre-images x and x′ of two distinct random elements in Y. For this purpose,
he defines the Boolean function g : [N3]→ {0, 1} such that
g(x) =
{
1 if f(x) ∈ Y
0 otherwise.
There are exactly N values of x such that g(x) = 1, out of N3 points in the domain of g.
Therefore, Bob can find one such random x with O
(√
N3/N
)
= O(N) calls to function f ,
using generalized Grover’s algorithm (or BBHT) [6]. He needs to repeat this process twice in
order to get both x and x′, using a small variation in function g the second time to make sure
that x′ 6= x. If f(x′) was transmitted before f(x) at Step 1, Bob swaps x and x′.
3. Bob sends back w = t(x)⊕ t(x′) to Alice.
4 It will be convenient, and sometimes required, that “⊕ ” defines a group operation on the set [M ] on which it
acts, for various values of M . For this reason, we shall always take M = 2ℓ for some integer ℓ, so that elements of
[M ] can be identified to bit strings, on which the meaning of the bitwise exclusive-or is clear. As a slight technicality,
the ℓ-bit string identified to integer i ∈ [M ] should be the binary representation of i− 1 to take account of the fact
that the elements of [M ] are integers between 1 and M , rather than between 0 and M − 1. Since M will always be
a power of N in our protocols, it suffices to implicitly consider that N is a power of 2.
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4. Alice queries oracle t once on each element of X. No further query is required for her to find
the two elements xi and xj in X such that 1 6 i < j 6 N and t(xi)⊕ t(xj) = w.
5. The key shared by Alice and Bob is (xi, xj) for Alice and (x, x
′) for Bob, which is indeed the
same.
All counted, Alice makes N classical queries to f in Step 1 and N classical queries to t in Step 4,
whereas Bob makes O(N) quantum queries to f in Step 2 and two classical queries to t in Step 3.
If the protocol is constructed over a binary random oracle, it will have to be called O(N logN)
times since it takes O(logN) binary queries to compute either function on any given input.
3.1 Quantum Attack
All the obvious (and not so obvious) cryptanalytic attacks against this scheme, such as direct use
of Grover’s algorithm (or BBHT), or even more sophisticated attacks based on amplitude ampli-
fication [7], require the eavesdropper to call functions f and t a total of Ω(N2) times. However,
a more powerful attack based on the paradigm of quantum walks in Markov chains [19] enables the
eavesdropper to recover Alice and Bob’s key with an expected O
(
N5/3
)
calls to f and O
(
N2/3
)
calls to t. This attack is reminiscent of Ambainis’ quantum algorithm for element distinctness [1],
which can find the two elements i and j such that e(i) = e(j) with O
(
N2/3
)
expected queries to
single-collision function e whose domain contains N elements
Ambainis’ algorithm uses a quantum walk on the Johnson graph J(N, r). This graph is an
undirected graph in which each node contains an r-subset of [N ] and there is an edge between two
nodes if and only if they differ by exactly two elements. Intuitively, we may think of “walking” from
one node to an adjacent node by dropping one element and replacing it by another. The task is to
find a specific k-subset of [N ]. The nodes that contain this subset are called marked. However, for
our cryptanalytic task, we need to walk on a Hamming graph instead, in which the nodes contain
lists rather than subsets, so that repetitions are allowed and the order in which items are listed
matters.
Magniez, Nayak, Roland and Santha have proved a general theorem, showing that quantum
search algorithms can be derived from a large class of classical Markov chains [16]. The cost of
the resulting quantum algorithm can be written as a function of S, U and C. These are the cost of
setting-up the quantum register in a state that corresponds to the stationary distribution, updating
it unitarily by moving from one node to an adjacent node, and checking if a node is marked in
order to flip its phase if it is, respectively.
Theorem 1 ([16]). Let P be a reversible ergodic Markov chain with spectral gap δ > 0. Then there
is a quantum algorithm that finds a marked node, with high probability, provided there is at least
one, at an expected cost in the order of
S+ 1√
ε
(
1√
δ
U+ C
)
,
where ε is the probability that a random node be marked.
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Theorem 2. There exists a quantum eavesdropping strategy that obtains the key established in
Protocol 1 with O
(
N5/3
)
expected queries to functions f and t.
Proof. Intuitively, we apply Ambainis’ algorithm for element distinctness with two modifications:
(1) instead of looking for i and j such that e(i) = e(j), we are looking for x and x′ such that
t(x)⊕ t(x′) = w and (2) instead of being able to get randomly chosen values in the image of e with
a single call to oracle e per value, we need to get random elements of X by applying BBHT on
the list Y and then query t on them, which requires O
(√
N3/N
)
= O(N) calls to f and one query
to t per element. The second modification explains why the number of calls to f , compared to
O
(
N2/3
)
calls to e for element distinctness, is multiplied by O(N). Hence, we need O
(
N5/3
)
calls
to function f . To determine the number of calls required to function t, however, we have to delve
deeper into the eavesdropping algorithm.
The composed structure of the problem prevents us from using a quantum walk on the Johnson
graph, which was at the core of Ambainis’ algorithm. Instead, we base the eavesdropping algorithm
on a quantum walk on the Hamming graph H(X, r), in which X is Alice’s secret set and r is a
number to be determined later. The nodes of the Hamming graph are labelled by ordered r-tuples
of elements of X. There is an edge between two nodes when they differ on precisely one position.
One can think of walking on the graph by replacing exactly one element at each step. This graph
has been used by Childs and Kothari to study the quantum query complexity of minor-close graph
properties [10]. These authors have proved that the spectral gap δ of this graph is Ω(1/r). The
quantum search algorithm on the Hamming graph defined below also maintains a data structure
at each node consisting of the image of each element of the node under the random oracle t.
We are looking for a node that contains two elements x and x′ such that t(x)⊕ t(x′) = w, where
w is the value announced by Bob in Step 3 of the protocol. We use Theorem 1 on the Hamming
graph, leading to a quantum search algorithm whose cost depends only on parameters S, U and
C, as mentioned above. The set-up cost S corresponds to finding r random elements of X, and
then querying t on them. Since BBHT can be used to find one such element with O(N) calls
to f , S consists of O(rN) calls to f and r calls to t. The update cost U corresponds to finding one
random element of X, which is O(N) calls to f , again by BBHT, and one call to t. The checking
cost C requires us to decide if there are elements x and x′ in the node such that t(x)⊕ t(x′) = w,
which can be done without any additional queries. Finally, the probability ε for a random node to
be marked is Ω
(
r2/N2
)
. Putting it all together, the expected cryptanalytic cost is
S+ 1√
ε
(
1√
δ
U+ C
)
= S+O
(
N
r (
√
rU+ C)
)
= S+O
(
N√
r
U
)
= O
(
(rN calls to f + r calls to t) + N√
r
(N calls to f + one call to t)
)
= O
(
rN +N2/
√
r
)
calls to f and O
(
r +N/
√
r
)
calls to t .
To minimize the number of calls to f , we choose r so that rN = N2/
√
r, which is r = N2/3.
It follows that a quantum eavesdropper is able to find the key with an expected O
(
N5/3
)
calls to f
and O
(
N2/3
)
calls to t.
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3.2 Lower Bound
We prove in this section that the preceding quantum attack against our quantum protocol is optimal.
This claim is formalized by the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Any quantum eavesdropping strategy that recovers the key established in Protocol 1
requires a total of Ω
(
N5/3
)
queries to functions f and t, except with vanishing probability.
The proof of this theorem consists of five steps.
1. We define 2XOR, pSEARCH and their composition H related to the hardness of breaking our
protocol;
2. We prove a lower bound on the difficulty of solving H (Lemma 1). For this purpose, we need
a new composition theorem for the generalized adversary method, whose precise statement
and technical proof are postponed to Section 7;
3. We reduce H to a less structured search problem, giving the same desired lower bound
(Lemma 2);
4. Using a random self-reducibility argument, we transform the lower bound proven at Step 3
to make it hold on random inputs, except with vanishing probability (Lemma 3); and
5. We reduce our search problem to the eavesdropping problem against our protocol. More
precisely, we show that any attack on our key establishment scheme that would have a non-
vanishing probability of success after o
(
N5/3
)
calls to functions f and t could be turned into
an algorithm capable of solving the search problem more efficiently than possible (proof of
Theorem 3).
A subtlety arises from the fact that cryptographic security requires lower bounds that hold
on random inputs, except with vanishing probability. The lower bounds proven in Lemma 1 and
Lemma 2 hold only for worst-case complexity. The purpose of Lemma 3 is precisely to prove a
hardness result in a model that is relevant to cryptography.
In the first step, we compose the 2XOR problem defined below with N instances of a search
problem with promise called pSEARCH, which defines the starting search problem H. For a set X
of positive integers, let X ′ denote X ∪ {0}. We first define the three problems formally.
Definition 1. Consider an arbitrary integer M , a target w ∈ [M ] and a function ξ : [N ]→ [M ]
so that there exist only two distinct elements i and j in [N ] for which ξ(i)⊕ ξ(j) = w. The 2XOR
problem consists in finding these elements.
It is elementary to adapt Ambainis’ element distinctness algorithm [1] to solve the 2XOR problem
with O
(
N2/3
)
quantum queries to function ξ, a result that we do not actually need. More the
point, Aleksandrs Belovs and Robert Sˇpalek have proved that this performance is optimal [4].
More precisely, given an arbitrary fixed target w, any quantum algorithm for this problem requires
Ω
(
N2/3
)
quantum queries to ξ in the worst case, provided M > N2.
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Definition 2. Consider the set P ⊂ ([M ]′)N2 of strings (a1, . . . , aN2) with the promise that exactly
one value is nonzero. The problem pSEARCH : P → [M ] consists in finding this nonzero value by
making queries that take i as input and return ai, 1 6 i 6 N
2.
Grover’s algorithm [13] solves this problem with O
(√
N2
)
= O(N) queries, and the first ever
lower bound on the power of quantum computing [5] shows that this too is optimal.
Definition 3. The problem H is defined by H = 2XOR ◦ pSEARCHN.
Intuitively, an instance of H is obtained by “hiding” the inputs of 2XOR in “buckets” in which
all but one of the values are 0. More specifically, consider a function h : [N ]× [N2]→ [M ]′ where
M > N2. The domain of this function is composed ofN buckets of sizeN2, where h(i, ·) corresponds
to the ith bucket for 1 6 i 6 N . In bucket i, all values of the function are 0 except for one single
xi ∈ [N2] for which h(i, xi) = ξ(i):
h(i, j) =
{
ξ(i) if j = xi
0 otherwise.
It follows from the definitions of ξ and h that there is a single pair of distinct a and b in the domain
of h such that h(a)⊕ h(b) = w with h(a) 6= 0 and h(b) 6= 0. How difficult is it to find this pair
given a black box for function h but no direct access to ξ?
The goal of the second step of the proof is to answer this question, which is given by Lemma 1.
Note that this lemma and the next (Lemma 2), as well as the above-mentioned lower bounds on
the difficulty of solving the 2XOR [4] and pSEARCH [5] problems, are stated and proved according
to the usual complexity-theoretic worst-case paradigm. This is obviously not what is needed for
cryptographic applications. The purpose of Lemma 3 is to remedy this situation.
Lemma 1. Given h structured as above, finding the pair of distinct elements a and b in the domain
of h such that h(a) ⊕ h(b) = w with h(a) 6= 0 and h(b) 6= 0 requires Ω(N5/3) quantum queries to h.
Proof. The search problem can be modelled as the composition of 2XOR across buckets with finding
the single nonzero entry in each bucket, which is the problem pSEARCH defined above. Høyer,
Lee and Sˇpalek have proved a composition theorem for the quantum query complexity of such
functions [14], later improved by Lee, Mittal, Reichard, Sˇpalek and Szegedy [15]. Unfortunately,
their theorems are not applicable in our case because they require the inner function to be Boolean,
which pSEARCH is not.
Therefore, a more general composition theorem is needed, whose proof we postpone to Section 7
because of its level of technicality. In particular, our problem becomes a special case of technical
Lemma 5 with parameters β = N (the number of buckets), σ = N2 (the size of the buckets),
γ =M = N c
′
for c′ > 12, and R = {(x, y) | x⊕y = w}. Given that the FR of Lemma 5 is the 2XOR
problem on β elements, whose quantum query complexity is Θ
(
β2/3
)
since γ > β2, it follows that
finding the desired elements a and b requires
Ω
(
β2/3σ1/2
)
= Ω
(
N2/3
√
N2
)
= Ω
(
N5/3
)
quantum queries to h.
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For Step 3, consider a slightly less structured search problem, in which there are no longer
buckets, but there is an added coordinate in the range of the function
h′ : [N3]→ [N ]′ × [M ]′ .
The purpose of the added coordinate [N ]′ will become clear in Step 5 of the proof. This function
is defined so that h′(a) = (0, 0) on all but N points w1, w2,. . . , wN in its domain. On these
points, h′(wi) = (i, ξ(i)), where ξ is the function considered at the beginning of Step 1. We are
required to find the unique pair of distinct a and b in [N3] such that π2(h
′(a))⊕ π2(h′(b)) = w with
π2(h
′(a)) 6= 0 and π2(h′(b)) 6= 0, where “π2 ” denotes the projection on the second coordinate.
Similarly, “π1 ” denotes the projection on the first coordinate.
The lower bound on the earlier search problem concerning h implies directly the same lower
bound on the new search problem concerning h′ since any algorithm capable of solving the new
problem can be used at the same cost to solve the earlier problem through randomization. In other
words, the more structured version of the problem cannot be harder than the less structured one.
The next lemma formalizes the argument above.
Lemma 2. Given h′ structured as above, finding the pair of distinct elements a and b in the domain
of h′ such that π2(h′(a))⊕ π2(h′(b)) = w with π2(h′(a)) 6= 0 and π2(h′(b)) 6= 0 requires Ω(N5/3)
quantum queries to h′.
Proof. Define intermediary function h˜ : [N ]× [N2]→ [N ]′ × [M ]′ by
h˜(i, j) =
{
(i, h(i, j)) = (i, ξ(i)) if h(i, j) 6= 0
(0, h(i, j)) = (0, 0) otherwise.
It is elementary to reduce the search problem concerning h to the one concerning h˜ as well as the
search problem concerning h˜ to the one concerning h′. Therefore, the lower bound concerning h
given by Lemma 1 applies mutatis mutandis to h′.
To prove Theorem 3, it remains to achieve Step 5, in which we show how to reduce the search
problem concerning h′ to the cryptanalytic difficulty for the eavesdropper to determine the key
that Alice and Bob have established by using our protocol. However, as mentioned above, the
lower bound we proved on the search problem is on its worst-case quantum query complexity, while
we want to prove that the cryptanalytic task of breaking Protocol 1 is hard except with vanishing
probability. This probability is to be taken over the random choices of Alice and Bob when they
establish their key, as well as over the random (or quantum) choices made by the eavesdropper
when trying to discover this key. Therefore, before describing the reduction, we prove that the
search problem concerning h′ remains hard, except with vanishing probability, when the instance
of the problem is chosen at random.
Lemma 3. Given a uniformly random h′ structured as above, finding the pair of distinct elements a
and b in the domain of h′ such that π2(h′(a))⊕ π2(h′(b)) = w with π2(h′(a)) 6= 0 and π2(h′(b)) 6= 0
requires Ω
(
N5/3
)
quantum queries to h′, except with vanishing probability.
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Proof. The proof is in two parts. In the first part, we show that solving the problem with bounded
error in the worst case reduces to solving the problem with bounded error on average. In the
second part, we show that the probability of solving the problem with o
(
N5/3
)
queries vanishes as
N grows.
Let A be an algorithm that solves the search problem with error probability ε after q queries
on average under a uniform distribution of the inputs. We first transform A into an algorithm A′
solving the same problem with q/ε queries in the worst case, which errs with probability 2ε on
average. The algorithm A′ is obtained by making A stop after q/ε queries. If A has terminated, A′
outputs the value calculated by A. Otherwise, it outputs a random value. By Markov’s inequality,
the probability that A answers after q/ε queries is at least 1 − ε. Therefore, A′ stops after q/ε
queries for any input, and errs with probability at most 2ε on average over uniformly chosen inputs.
Now, we make the error probability the same for each input. For this purpose, we define a new
algorithm A′′ that uses A′ as a subroutine. Before starting A′, the algorithm A′′ chooses uniformly
at random σ = (σ1, σ2, τk), where σ1 and σ2 are permutations of [N
3] and [N ], respectively, and τk
acts on [M ] in the following way: for x ∈ [M ], τk(x) = x⊕ k.
Whenever A′ queries h′ on x ∈ [N3], A′′ queries h′ on σ1(x). Then, if the answer to the
query is of the form (i, ξ(i)), it is replaced by (σ2(i), τk(ξ(i))). Note that from the definition of τk,
ξ(i) ⊕ ξ(j) = 0 if and only if τk(ξ(i)) ⊕ τk(ξ(j)) = 0. At the same time, for any x, τk(x) is
uniformly distributed on [M ] when k is chosen uniformly at random. Finally, if A′ finds the pair
of elements a and b, A′′ returns σ−11 (a) and σ−11 (b). Intuitively, σ generates a uniformly random
input. Consequently, the error probability of A′′ for each input equals the expected error of A′
under uniform distribution of the inputs. Therefore, we have designed an algorithm A′′ that makes
q/ε queries in the worst case and errs with probability at most 2ε for each input. This proves that
an algorithm solving the search problem concerning h′ structured as above, with bounded error on
average over uniform distribution of the inputs, requires Ω
(
N5/3
)
queries on average.
We now show that the probability of solving the search problem with q = o
(
N5/3
)
queries is
vanishing. Fix an algorithm B solving the search problem concerning h′ with bounded error on
average. Let Q denote the random variable that indicates the number of queries made by B, fix
q = o
(
N5/3
)
and denote δ = Prob[Q 6 q], where the probability is over uniformly distributed
inputs. Intuitively, δ cannot be large since otherwise it is possible to solve the problem with less
than q queries, contradicting the first part of the proof.
We devise an algorithm B′ that solves the search problem on h′ with approximately q/δ queries
on average. The algorithm B′ executes several times B for a fixed number of queries. Fix two
constants k and k′. Repeat k/δ times the following procedure: choose a uniformly random
σ = (σ1, σ2, τ), run B on the input transformed as explained in the first part of the proof, and
stop it after k′q queries. If B has terminated and returned a pair of elements a and b, B′ outputs
σ−11 (a) and σ
−1
1 (b). Otherwise, choose another permutation and run B again. If no pair of element
is found after k/δ executions of B, the algorithm B′ outputs a random value.
The total number of queries made by B′ is at most (k k′)q/δ. Choosing k and k′ large enough,
there is, with high probability, one execution of B that produces a correct answer. This can be
checked and B′ solves, on average, the search problem on h′ with bounded error. By the lower
bound proved in the first part, we get q/δ = Ω
(
N5/3
)
, which gives δ = O
(
q/N5/3
)
and therefore
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δ = o(1). This proves that an algorithm solving the search problem concerning h′ structured as
above requires Ω
(
N5/3
)
queries, except with vanishing probability.
Proof of Theorem 3. Consider any eavesdropping strategy A that listens to the communication
between Alice and Bob and tries to determine the key by querying black-box functions f and t.
In fact, there are no Alice and Bob at all! Instead, there is a function h′ : [N3]→ [N ]′ × [M ]′ as
described above, for which we want to solve the search problem by using unsuspecting A as a
resource.
We start by supplying A with a completely fake “conversation” between “Alice” and “Bob”:
for sufficiently large c and c′, we choose randomly N points y1, y2,. . . , yN in [N c] and one point
w ∈ [N c′ ] and we pretend that Alice has sent the y’s to Bob and that Bob has responded with w.
We also choose random functions fˆ : [N3]→ [N c] and tˆ : [N3]→ [N c′ ]. Note that the selection of
fˆ and tˆ may take a lot of time, but this does not count towards the number of queries that will
be made of function h′, and our lower bound on the search problem concerns only this number of
queries. We could be tempted to choose randomly the values of fˆ and tˆ on the fly, whenever they
are needed, but this is not an option for a quantum process because the values returned must be
consistent whenever the same input is queried in different paths of the superposition.
Now, we wait for A’s queries to f and t. When A asks for query i for some i ∈ [N3], there are
two possibilities.
• If h′(i) = (0, 0), return fˆ(i) and tˆ(i) to A as value for f(i) and t(i) respectively.
• Otherwise, return yπ1(h′(i)) and π2(h′(i)) to A as value for f(i) and t(i) respectively.
The purpose of the additional coordinate in the range of h′ now becomes clear. Whenever
h′(i) 6= (0, 0), the algorithm A should get one of the points y1, y2,. . . , yN supplied to A at the
beginning of this “artificial” cryptanalytic task. Without the added coordinate, one would have a
value ξ(i) in [M ] which is usually bigger than N , and it would not be possible to map it one-to-one
to a value in [N ] that can be used as index for some y. Adding a coordinate taking values in [N ]′
solves this problem. Notice that if A were classical, one would simply solve this problem using a
table that keeps track of any h′(i) 6= (0, 0). However, there is no obvious way of maintaining such
a process in the quantum case, where queries can be made in superposition.
SupposeA happily returns the pair (i, j) for which it was told that t(i)⊕ t(j) = w, which is what
a successful eavesdropper is supposed to do. This pair is in fact the answer to the search problem
concerning h′ since t(i)⊕ t(j) = w implies that π2(h′(a)) ⊕ π2(h′(b)) = w with π2(h′(a)) 6= 0 and
π2(h
′(b)) 6= 0, except with the vanishing probability that tˆ(i′)⊕ tˆ(j′) = w for some queries i′ and
j′ that A asks about t.
Queries asked by A concerning f and t are answered in the same way as they would be if f and
t were two random functions consistent with the Y and w announced by Alice and Bob during the
execution of a real protocol. To see this, remember that Y (subset of [N c]) and w (element of [N c
′
])
are uniformly picked at random in both the simulated and the real worlds. Moreover, the simulated
function f is such that f(i) is random when h′(i) = (0, 0). The remaining N output values are
in Y, as expected by A. On the other hand, the simulated function t is random everywhere, except
for the two elements i and j for which tˆ(i)⊕ tˆ(j) = w, as it is also expected by A. Therefore,
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A will behave in the environment provided by the simulation exactly as in the real world. Since we
disregard the vanishing possibility that there might exist a spurious solution to t(·)⊕ t(·) = w, the
reduction solves the search problem concerning h′ whenever A succeeds in finding the key. Notice
finally that each (new) question asked by A to either f or t translates to one question actually
asked to h′.
It follows that any successful cryptanalytic strategy that makes o
(
N5/3
)
total queries to f and
t would solve the search problem with only o
(
N5/3
)
queries to function h′, which is impossible,
except with vanishing probability. This demonstrates the Ω
(
N5/3
)
lower bound on the cryptanalytic
difficulty of breaking our key establishment protocol, again except with vanishing probability, which
matches the upper bound provided by the explicit attack given in Section 3.1.
4 Fully Classical Key Establishment Scheme
In this section, we revert to the original setting imagined by Merkle in the sense that Alice and Bob
are now purely classical. However, we still allow full quantum power to the eavesdropper. Recall
that Merkle’s original schemes [17, 18] are completely broken in this context [9]. Is it possible
to restore some security in this highly adversarial (and unfair!) scenario? The following purely
classical key establishment protocol, which is inspired by our quantum protocol described in the
previous section, provides a positive answer to this conundrum.
This time, black-box random functions f and t are defined on a smaller domain to compensate
for the fact that classical Bob can no longer use Grover’s algorithm. Specifically, f : [N2]→ [N c]
and t : [N2]→ [N c′ ], with c > 4 and c′ > 8 for reasons similar to those explained at the beginning
of Section 3. As before, these two functions could be replaced by a single binary random oracle.
Protocol 2 (Classical vs quantum).
1. Alice picks at random N distinct points x1, x2, . . . , xN in the domain of f and transmits
their encrypted values yi = f(xi) to Bob. Let X and Y denote {xi | 1 6 i 6 N} and
{yi | 1 6 i 6 N}, respectively.
2. Bob finds the pre-images x and x′ of two distinct random elements in Y. To find each one of
them, he chooses random values in [N2] and applies f to them until one is found whose image
is in Y. He is expected to succeed after O(N) calls to function f . If f(x′) was transmitted
before f(x) at Step 1, Bob swaps x and x′. Until now this is almost identical to Merkle’s
original scheme, except for the fact that Bob needs to find two elements of X rather than one.
3. Bob sends back w = t(x)⊕ t(x′) to Alice.
4. Alice queries oracle t once on each element of X. No further query is required for her to find
the two elements xi and xj in X such that 1 6 i < j 6 N and t(xi)⊕ t(xj) = w.
5. The key shared by Alice and Bob is (xi, xj) for Alice and (x, x
′) for Bob, which is indeed the
same.
All counted, Alice makes N queries to f in Step 1 and N queries to t in Step 4, whereas Bob
makes O(N) expected queries to f in Step 2 and two queries to t in Step 3. The total expected
number of classical queries to f and t is therefore in O(N) for both legitimate parties.
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4.1 Quantum Attack
Theorem 4. There exists a quantum eavesdropping strategy that obtains the key established in
Protocol 2 with O(N7/6) expected queries to functions f and t.
Proof. A quantum eavesdropper can set-up a quantum walk very similar to the one explained in
Section 3.1, except that now the domain is of size N2 instead of N3. The eavesdropper can find
random elements of X from his knowledge of Y with an expected
O
(√
N2/N
)
= O
(√
N
)
calls to f per element of X. Therefore, the set-up cost S is O
(
r
√
N
)
calls to f and r calls to t, the
update cost U is O
(√
N
)
calls to f and one call to t, and the checking cost C vanishes. Furthermore,
δ is still Θ(1/r) but ε is Ω(r2/N).
Putting it all together, the expected quantum cryptanalytic cost is
S+O
(
N√
r
U
)
= O
(
(r
√
N calls to f + r calls to t) + N√
r
(
√
N calls to f + one call to t)
)
= O
(
r
√
N +N3/2/
√
r
)
calls to f and O
(
r +N/
√
r
)
calls to t .
To minimize the number of calls to f , we choose r so that r
√
N = N3/2/
√
r, which is r = N2/3.
It follows that a quantum eavesdropper is able to find the key with an expected O
(
N7/6
)
calls to f
and O
(
N2/3
)
calls to t.
4.2 Lower Bound
The proof that it is not possible for the eavesdropper to find the key with fewer than Ω
(
N7/6
)
calls
to f and t, except with vanishing probability, follows the same lines as the lower bound proof in
Section 3.2. It is therefore possible for purely classical Alice and Bob to agree on a shared key after
calling f and t an expected number of times in the order of N whereas it is not possible, even for
a quantum eavesdropper, to be privy to their secret with an effort in the same order, except with
vanishing probability.
Theorem 5. Any quantum eavesdropping strategy that recovers the key established in Protocol 2
requires a total of Ω
(
N7/6
)
queries to functions f and t, except with vanishing probability.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 3. The only difference is that Lemma 5 is applied
in Lemma 1 with parameters σ = N and γ =M = N c
′
for c′ > 8, rather σ = N2 and c′ > 12.
Parameter β = N remains the same. The proof then follows mutatis mutandis.
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5 Generalized Protocols
In Sections 3 and 4, we presented a quantum and a classical protocol for key establishment over a
classical channel. In both of them, Bob finds the preimages x and x′ of two distinct elements sent
by Alice, and he sends her back t(x)⊕ t(x′). A natural extension of these protocols is for Bob to
find k preimages b1, b2, . . . , bk, for some constant k > 2, and send back to Alice t(b1)⊕ · · · ⊕ t(bk).
This observation leads to a sequence of quantum and classical protocols, denoted Qk and Ck,
respectively, with the following properties. In protocol Qk (resp. Ck), Alice and Bob establish a
secret key with O(N) quantum (resp. classical) queries to the oracle, whereas the best possible
quantum eavesdropping strategy requires Θ
(
N1+
k
k+1
)
(resp. Θ
(
N
1
2
+ k
k+1
)
) expected queries.
These protocols are based on the kXOR problem, which is to search for k elements among N
whose bitwise exclusive-or yields a given value w. In this regard, the protocol presented in Section 3
can be referred to as Q2 and the protocol in Section 4 as C2.
The kXOR problem belongs to a large family of problems that have been extensively studied. The
element distinctness problem is exactly the 2XOR problem with w = 0. The algorithm proposed
by Ambainis for this problem was designed for the larger family of k-distinctness problems [1].
In these, we want to decide if there exist k elements in the domain of a given function that map
to the same image. The quantum-walk-based algorithm designed by Ambainis queries the function
O
(
Nk/(k+1)
)
times. However, for k > 2, this algorithm has been improved by Belovs to needing
only O
(
N1−2
k−2/(2k−1)) queries, using the learning graph paradigm [3].
Ambainis’ algorithm applies equally well to other problems, in particular to the kXOR problem,
with the same quantum query complexity, but Belovs’ improvement does not carry through. Indeed,
Belovs and Sˇpalek have proved a lower bound [4] matching Ambainis’ algorithm [1] for the following
more general problem. Let G be an arbitrary finite Abelian group and s be an element of G. Given
an integer k, the kSUM problem is to decide whether an input X = {x1, . . . , xN} ∈ GN contains a
subset of k elements that sums to s.
Theorem 6 ([4]). For a fixed k, the quantum query complexity of the kSUM problem is Ω(Nk/(k+1))
provided that |G| > Nk.
Choosing G = [M ] with ⊕ as group operation, Theorem 6 yields a lower bound on the query
complexity of kXOR provided we have M > Nk, where [M ] is the range of values from which the
N elements that define the instances of kXOR are taken.
5.1 Quantum protocols
We first introduce formally the sequence of protocols Qk for any constant k > 2. We assume the
existence of two black-box random functions f : [N3]→ [N c] and t : [N3]→ [N c′ ]. We choose c > 6
to ensure that a uniformly random f is one-to-one except with vanishing probability. Similarly, we
choose c′ such that the function that maps k-sets of elements {a1, . . . , ak} to t(a1)⊕ · · · ⊕ t(ak) is
one-to-one, except with vanishing probability. Choosing c′ > 6k is sufficient, and also ensures that
Theorem 6 applies.
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Protocol 3 (Generalized quantum vs quantum).
1. Alice picks at random N distinct points x1, x2, . . . , xN in the domain of f and transmits
their encrypted values yi = f(xi) to Bob. Let X and Y denote {xi | 1 6 i 6 N} and
{yi | 1 6 i 6 N}, respectively.
2. Bob finds k distinct elements in X, which we call b1, b2, . . . , bk. Each element is found using
BBHT [6], as in Protocol 1.
3. Bob sends back w = t(b1)⊕ · · · ⊕ t(bk) to Alice.
4. Alice queries oracle t once on each element of X. No further query is required for her to find
k distinct elements of X, say a1, a2, . . . , ak, such that t(a1)⊕ · · · ⊕ t(ak) = w.
5. Alice and Bob reorder their k elements of X obtained at Step 4 and Step 2, respectively, to
reflect the order in which their images had been transmitted by Alice at Step 1. The resulting
k-tuple is their shared key.
All counted, Alice makes exactly N classical queries to f in Step 1 and N classical queries to t
in Step 4, whereas Bob makes O(kN) quantum queries to f in Step 2, which is simply O(N) since
k is a constant, and k classical queries to t in Step 3.
The optimal eavesdropper’s attack is again a quantum walk on the Hamming graph.
Theorem 7. There exists a quantum eavesdropping strategy that obtains the key established in
Protocol 3 with O
(
N1+
k
k+1
)
expected queries to functions f and t.
Proof. We apply Theorem 1 to the walk on the Hamming graph once again. The set-up cost S
is O(rN) calls to f and r calls to t. The update cost U is O(N) calls to f and one query to t.
The checking cost C requires us to decide if there are k distinct elements c1, c2, . . . , ck in the node
such that w = t(c1)⊕ · · · ⊕ t(ck), which can be done without any additional queries. Finally, the
probability for a random element to be marked is Ω
(
rk/Nk
)
. Putting it all together, the expected
eavesdropping cost is
S+O
(
Nk/2
rk/2
(
√
rU+ C)
)
= O
(
rN +
N ·Nk/2
r(k−1)/2
)
calls to f and O
(
r +
Nk/2
r(k−1)/2
)
calls to t .
To optimize the number of calls to f and t, we choose r so that rN = N ·Nk/2/r(k−1)/2, which is
r = Nk/k+1. The theorem follows when replacing r with this value.
Finally, we prove a matching lower bound on the number of queries required for the adversary
to recover the key in this protocol.
Theorem 8. Any quantum eavesdropping strategy that recovers the key established in Protocol 3
requires a total of Ω
(
N1+
k
k+1
)
queries to functions f and t, except with vanishing probability.
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The proof is similar to those of Theorems 3 and 5. The only difference is that security is based
on the quantum query complexity of the kSUM problem [4], which is a generalization of the 2XOR
problem used in Sections 3 and 4. We provide some details to emphasize where this change comes
into account.
First, consider a function ξ : [N ]→ [M ] such that there exists a single set of k distinct
elements c1, c2, . . . , ck in [N ] for which ξ(c1)⊕ · · · ⊕ ξ(ck) = w. Then, consider a function
h : [N ]× [N2]→ [M ]′, whose domain is composed of N “buckets” of size N2, where h(i, ·) corre-
sponds to the ith bucket, 1 6 i 6 N . In bucket i, all values of the function are 0 except for one
single random xi ∈ [N2] for which h(i, xi) = ξ(i):
h(i, j) =
{
ξ(i) if j = xi
0 otherwise.
Lemma 4 (Lower bound for h). Given h structured as above, finding the k distinct elements
d1, d2, . . . , dk in the domain of h such that h(di) 6= 0 for all 1 6 i 6 k and h(d1)⊕ · · · ⊕ h(dk) = w
requires Ω
(
N1+
k
k+1
)
quantum queries to h.
Proof. This problem is a composition of pSEARCH and kXOR. Therefore, we can apply Lemma 5
and Theorem 6. It follows that finding d1, d2, . . . , dk requires
Ω
(
Nk/k+1
√
N2
)
= Ω
(
N1+
k
k+1
)
quantum queries to h.
The rest of the proof of Theorem 8 is identical to the proofs of Theorems 3 and 5.
5.2 Classical Protocols
We now present the sequence of protocols Ck for any constant k > 2. In protocol Ck, a classical
Alice establishes a key with a classical Bob after O(N) classical queries to a random oracle in such
a way that the optimal eavesdropping strategy requires Θ
(
N
1
2
+ k
k+1
)
quantum queries to the same
random oracle.
We assume the existence of two black-box random functions f : [N2]→ [N c] and
t : [N2]→ [N c′ ]. We choose c > 4 to ensure that a uniformly random f is one-to-one except
with vanishing probability. Similarly, we choose c′ such that the function that maps k-sets of ele-
ments {a1, . . . , ak} to t(a1)⊕ · · · ⊕ t(ak) is one-to-one, except with vanishing probability. Choosing
c′ > 4k is sufficient, and also ensures that Theorem 6 applies.
Protocol 4 (Generalized classical vs quantum).
1. Alice picks at random N distinct points x1, x2, . . . , xN in the domain of f and transmits
their encrypted values yi = f(xi) to Bob. Let X and Y denote {xi | 1 6 i 6 N} and
{yi | 1 6 i 6 N}, respectively.
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2. Bob finds k distinct elements in X, which we call b1, b2, . . . , bk. To find each one of them, he
chooses random values in [N2] and applies f to them until a new one is found whose image
is in Y.
3. Bob sends back w = t(b1)⊕ · · · ⊕ t(bk) to Alice.
4. Alice queries oracle t once on each element of X. No further query is required for her to find
k distinct elements of X, say a1, a2, . . . , ak, such that t(a1)⊕ · · · ⊕ t(ak) = w.
5. Alice and Bob reorder their k elements of X obtained at Step 4 and Step 2, respectively, to
reflect the order in which their images had been transmitted by Alice at Step 1. The resulting
k-tuple is their shared key.
We leave to the reader the proofs of the upper and lower bounds, as stated in the following two
theorems. They can easily be derived by adapting the analogous proofs for previous protocols.
Theorem 9. There exists a quantum eavesdropping strategy that obtains the key established in
Protocol 4 with O
(
N
1
2
+ k
k+1
)
expected queries to functions f and t.
Theorem 10. Any quantum eavesdropping strategy that recovers the key established in Protocol 4
requires a total of Ω
(
N
1
2
+ k
k+1
)
queries to functions f and t, except with vanishing probability.
6 Time complexity of our protocols
In Sections 3 to 5, we only counted the number of queries as a measure of complexity. In this section,
we consider the time complexity of our protocols, as well as other “practical” issues. Notice that
a lower bound on query complexity is also a lower bound on time complexity. Therefore, our
lower-bound theorems on the eavesdropper’s task apply automatically to the time needed to break
our protocols. Our goal in this section is to address the issue of when the legitimate players have
time-efficient strategies.
In any real implementation of our protocols, all black-box functions (modelled until now by
random oracles) would have to be replaced by one-way functions. More specifically, all our proofs
of security are conditioned in practice on the existence (and use) of functions that cannot be
inverted more efficiently than by the exhaustive search throughout their domain of a preimage,
which has not yet been demonstrated. Nevertheless, this is probably the weakest assumption that
can be made in computationally-based cryptography in order to get provable security. Furthermore,
one might have objected to the notion of making queries in superposition to an oracle, whereas
there are no issues about quantum computing a function on a superposition of inputs when it is
specified by a quantum circuit. In any case, we shall assume henceforth that functions f and t
from our protocols can be computed in constant time. If this is not the case, the time required by
all parties is multiplied by the time it takes to compute these functions. An unfair case, which we
do not consider here, may occur if these functions can be computed more efficiently on a quantum
computer and if only the eavesdropper is endowed with one.
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All the key-establishment protocols that we have presented share the following structure.
• Alice picks N points at random and sends the set Y of their images under function f to Bob.
• Bob searches for a set of preimages of a given size using either a classical or a quantum
strategy, and sends it back to Alice, encoded.
• Alice recovers Bob’s set, which becomes the key under canonical ordering.
In the first step, Alice is only querying the oracle (or computing function f) and no post-
processing is required. This can be done in O(N) time.
In the second step, Bob searches for the preimages using either a quantum or a classical strategy.
In either case, we showed that an expectation of O(N) queries suffices per preimage. However, this
may require an additional logN factor in terms of time because each query (whether or not in
superposition) is followed by a binary search to check for membership in Y, as already mentioned
in Footnote 3 of Section 2.1. Thus, even though Bob needs only O(N) queries, this translates into
O(N logN) time. In the case of classical protocols (Sections 4 and 5.2), Bob can use universal
hashing [11] to build a table for Y in O(N) expected time, and then use it in constant expected
time per search, so that his total expected time remains in O(N). However, there is no obvious way
to extend the use of universal hashing to the quantum protocols because all possible queries would
be launched on the hash table in superposition, so that we would need good hashing performance
in the worst case rather than in the expected sense. It turns out that a slight variation on our
quantum protocols can guarantee a worst-case linear-time effort for Bob, as we now explain after
a brief detour concerning a seldom-recognized practical issue involving quantum memories.
Our quantum protocols (Sections 3 and 5.1) require Bob to use a quantum memory to run the
BBHT algorithm in his search for random elements of Alice’s set X. Consider for instance the
specific description of Step 2 in Protocol 1. It involves O(N) Grover iterations. Each iteration
involves a single call on function f (in a superposition of inputs), followed by a test of membership
in Y of the output of the function. This test requires the use of a memory of size N to hold Y,
which must be accessible in a quantum superposition of its addresses because f is queried in a
superposition of all possible inputs (with nonuniform amplitudes in general) during each Grover
iteration inside the BBHT algorithm. The use of such quantum memories has been a mostly
unchallenged standard practice in quantum algorithmics at least since the 1997 paper of Ref. [8].
Furthermore, in the legitimate protocols presented here (but not in their cryptanalytic attacks),
it suffices to have a memory that has to be loaded once with classical values (the elements of set Y ),
but that never needs to be updated once the quantum part of Bob’s process—BBHT—has been
launched. Nevertheless, Dominique Unruh has pointed out that it may be unfair to count such
quantum memory accesses at unit or even logarithmic cost in the memory size [21]. Be it as it
may, quantum memories would likely be the most technologically challenging aspect to deploying
our protocols, and therefore it would be preferable if their need could be avoided.
We can modify our quantum protocols to remove any need for quantum memories, yet without
compromising their security. We only sketch here the modifications that are needed for Protocol 1;
the corresponding modifications for Protocol 3 are identical, mutatis mutandis. Instead of having
two functions f : [N3]→ [N c] and t : [N3]→ [N c′ ], we need 2N functions fi : [N2]→ [N c] and
ti : [N
2]→ [N c′ ], for 1 6 i 6 N . The first step of the protocol is the same, except that Alice defines
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each yi as fi(xi). In the second step, Bob chooses two indices i < j at random in [N ]. He uses the
standard Grover algorithm (there is no need for BBHT anymore) to find the preimages x and x′ of yi
and yj under fi and fj, respectively. This requires O
(√
N2
)
= O(N) Grover iterations without any
need for a quantum memory nor for an additional logarithmic factor in the time analysis. The rest
of the protocol is unchanged, except of course that Bob computes w as ti(x)⊕ tj(x′) and that Alice
queries ti on each of her xi. Note that this modified protocol is more similar to Merkle’s published
“puzzles” [18], whereas our Protocols 1 to 4 are closer in spirit to Merkle’s original unpublished
idea [17].
The proof of security of the modified protocol is almost identical to the proof given in Section 3.2,
except that it is in fact simpler because there is no need for Lemma 2 nor for function h′ and the
“less structured search problem” based on it. Indeed, the search problem based on h, whose worst-
case query complexity is proved as early as Lemma 1, can be reduced directly to the cryptanalytic
task against the modified protocol. We leave details to the reader. Note that the optimal attack
against Protocol 1, given in the proof of Theorem 2, once adapted against the modified protocol,
would still require the eavesdropper to make use of quantum memories in order to perform quantum
walks. Actually, the quantum walk paradigm [19] requires quantum memories whose contents is
changed dynamically during the execution of the algorithm, which would be significantly more
challenging from a technological point of view. However, following the usual paranoia in quantum
cryptography, we are willing to grant the adversary unlimited technology, provided the laws of
quantum mechanics are not violated.
Let us now turn our attention to the final process by which Alice recovers the key from the
information she had kept and the information she has received from Bob. Although we consider
here the situation that corresponds to Protocols 1 to 4, the algorithms we give below for Alice can
be adapted in an obvious way for use with the modified protocols that do not require the legitimate
parties to use quantum memories, including a modified version of Protocol 3.
We already know that Alice needs only N queries to function t since it suffices for her to obtain
once each value of t(xi) and store them in a classical memory for future use. However, it may seem
at first that she will need Ω(Nk) time to try a significant proportion of all the possible k-tuples
among the N stored values of t(xi) before hitting upon one whose elements exclusive-or to the value
w received from Bob. Even when k = 2 for Protocols 1 and 2, a time in Ω(N2) for the legitimate
parties would obviously be intolerable. We now show that Alice can find the key time-efficiently
within the protocols of Sections 3 and 4.
Theorem 11. Alice can find classically two elements x and x′ in X such that t(x)⊕ t(x′) = w in
worst-case O(N logN) time or in expected O(N) time.
Proof. By querying t once on each element of X, Alice forms Z = {t(x)⊕ w | x ∈ X} and she sorts
it in O(N logN) time. Now, it suffices for her to try each value of t(x′), x′ ∈ X , until one is found
that belong to Z. By definition of Z there will be an x ∈ X so that t(x′) = t(x)⊕ w, which implies
that t(x) ⊕ t(x′) = w as required. Each of the (at most) N search operations is carried out in
O(logN) time by virtue of using binary search, for a total of O(N logN) time in the worst-case.
Alternatively, Alice can use universal hashing [11] to build a table for Z in O(N) expected time,
and then search in it in expected constant time per element of the form t(x′), x′ ∈ X, for a total
of O(N) expected time.
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Table 1: Lower bounds on the time needed by quantum eavesdropping against various classical and
quantum protocols when the legitimate parties establish a key in O(N logN) expected time.
Alice Bob Protocol Adversary’s lower bound
Classical Classical C2 Ω(N
7/6)
Classical Quantum Q2 Ω(N
5/3)
Quantum Quantum Q3 Ω(N
7/4)
This idea can be used by a classical Alice to remain time-efficient in Protocols C2 and Q2 of
Section 5. A quantum Alice can do better, however, as indicated by the following theorem, making
Q3 time-efficient as well.
Theorem 12. Using a quantum strategy, Alice can find the elements x, x′ and x′′ in X such that
t(x)⊕ t(x′)⊕ t(x′′) = w in time O(N logN).
Proof. By querying t once on each element of X, Alice forms Z = {t(x)⊕ w | x ∈ X} and she sorts
it in O(N logN) time. Then, she uses Grover’s search algorithm to find a pair (x′, x′′) ∈ X ×X
such that t(x′)⊕ t(x′′) belongs to Z. It takes O(√N2 ) = O(N) Grover iterations to find this pair
and each iteration takes O(logN) time by virtue of binary search in Z. Now, Alice can easily
find the x ∈ X such that t(x′)⊕ t(x′′) = t(x)⊕ w, which solves the problem since it follows that
t(x)⊕ t(x′)⊕ t(x′′) = w, as desired.
Unfortunately, the quantum algorithm in the proof of Theorem 12 requires the use of a quantum
memory to hold Z. We do not know how to solve this problem otherwise. Table 1 summarizes the
time separations that we get between the legitimate parties and the eavesdropper. In each case,
it is assumed that the adversary is quantum mechanical and that the legitimate parties agree on
a shared key in O(N)—or at worst O(N logN)—expected time. Only the last line in the table
requires the use of a quantum memory on the part of the legitimate parties.
7 A Composition Theorem for Quantum Query Complexity
The central technical part of our lower bounds consists in analysing the complexity of a function
closely related to the hardness of breaking the key establishment protocols. This function is obtained
by composing another function with a variant of the search problem, as we describe now.
We wish the show that the following general task is hard. We are given a k-ary relation R defined
on some domain [γ], and asked to find a k-tuple that satisfies R, with the additional requirement
that the k-tuple is formed from elements in the image of a function c. The relation R is known, so
testing if a k-tuple satisfies R is free. However, we are charged for obtaining information about c.
The difficulty of our task is compounded by the fact that we cannot access c by querying it directly.
Instead, we can only make queries of the form (i, j), which yield c(i) only if j = v(i), where v is
also hidden.
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More formally, we define the function h to which we can make queries as follows (see Section 3.2).
Recall that X ′ denotes X ∪ {0}, where X is an arbitrary set of positive integers. Consider four inte-
ger parameters β, σ, γ and k, and three functions c : [β]→ [γ], v : [β]→ [σ] and h : [β]× [σ]→ [γ]′
so that there exists a single k-tuple u1, . . . , uk of elements in the image of c satisfying relation R,
and
h(i, j) =
{
c(i) if j = v(i)
0 otherwise.
The task is to find this k-tuple, having only access to a black box that computes h. Let FR denote
the (easier) problem of finding those elements given a black box that computes c rather than h.
Our problem can then be thought of as searching among σ possibilities for the sole nonzero h(i, ·)
for each i and then solving FR on those elements. Our main technical lemma, below, gives a lower
bound on the number of queries to h that are required to complete this task.
Lemma 5. Finding a k-tuple satisfying R, having only access to a black box that computes a
function h structured as above, requires Ω
(
Q(FR
)
σ1/2) quantum queries to h, where Q(FR) denotes
the quantum query complexity of FR.
Using h as an oracle for queries instead of c amounts to composing FR with search problem
pSEARCH, defined in Section 3.2 (Definition 2). Recall that P ⊂ (A′)σ, the domain of pSEARCH, is
the set of strings (a1, . . . , aσ) with the promise that exactly one of the values is nonzero, precisely
as in the definition of h. The function FR composed with β instances of pSEARCH, with A = [γ],
is denoted H. On input x ∈ P β,
H(x) = FR(pSEARCH(x1), . . . , pSEARCH(xβ)) .
We now prove that the quantum query complexity of H is Ω(Q(FR)σ
1/2). The proof uses the
generalized adversary method for quantum query complexity, which we briefly review here. Suppose
we want to determine the quantum query complexity of a problem F. First, we assign weights to
pairs of inputs in order to bring out how hard it is (in terms of number of queries) to distinguish
these inputs apart from one another. The adversary lower bound is the worst ratio of the spectral
norm of this matrix, which measures the overall progress necessary in order for the algorithm to
be correct, to the spectral norms of associated matrices, which measure the maximum amount of
progress that can be achieved by making a single query. For this purpose, we introduce the matrices
Dq defined as follows:
Dq[x, y] =
{
0 if xq = yq
1 otherwise.
Definition 4. Fix a function F : S → T . A symmetric matrix Γ : S × S → R is an adversary
matrix for F provided Γ[x, y] = 0 whenever F(x) = F(y). The adversary bound of F using Γ is
ADV±(F; Γ) = min
q
‖Γ‖
‖Γ •Dq‖
,
where • denotes entrywise (or Hadamard) product, and ‖A‖ denotes the spectral norm of A (which is
equal to its largest eigenvalue). The adversary bound ADV±(F) is the maximum, over all adversary
matrices Γ for F, of ADV±(F; Γ).
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Since H is defined as the composition of FR and pSEARCH, we would like to apply a composition
theorem for the generalized adversary method, which would say that if a function H = F ◦ Gβ,
then ADV±(H) > ADV±(F)ADV±(G). Unfortunately, the composition theorems already known
in the literature [14, 15] require the inner function to be Boolean, which is not the case here
for pSEARCH. Since counter-examples can be found, we cannot hope to prove a fully general
composition theorem in which the inner function would be an arbitrary function. Nevertheless, we
prove here a composition theorem with pSEARCH as the inner function.
Theorem 13. Let F : Aβ → B, pSEARCH : P → A with P ⊆ (A′)σ as described above, and
H = F ◦ pSEARCHβ. Then
ADV±(H) >
2
π
ADV±(F)ADV±(pSEARCH) .
The inner function can be slightly more general than pSEARCH. For example, it could be that
the element we search for is hidden in several places. The proof also goes through if the instances of
pSEARCH operate over distinct domains (A′i)
σi . We leave for further research the extent to which
our theorem can be generalized and proceed to prove it as stated.
Proof. We prove the theorem using only a few properties of pSEARCH, which we describe below.
In order to discriminate between the β instances of pSEARCH, and to simplify notation, we write
the inner functions as G1, . . . ,Gβ : P → A with P ⊆ (A′)σ, |A| = γ, and |P | = γσ. We use the fact
that Gi is σ-to-1 for all i. Without loss of generality, we assume that inputs are sorted according
to the output value. We use two crucial properties of pSEARCH. These follow from the definition
of an adversary matrix (Definition 4) as well as symmetry properties of pSEARCH.
1. A γσ × γσ optimal adversary matrix Γi for Gi can be written in block form with γ× γ blocks
of size σ×σ indexed by pairs of outputs in which all off-diagonal blocks are identical. Written
in this form, all γ diagonal blocks are necessarily zero since it is an adversary matrix.
2. The γσ × γσ matrices Dq, with inputs sorted in the same way, are also composed of identical
off-diagonal blocks ∆q and ∆
′
q on-diagonal blocks. Notice that this strongly depends on Gi,
since the inputs are sorted by output value.
For any function F, consider H = F ◦ (G1, . . . ,Gβ). Denote by Iγ and 1γ the γ × γ identity matrix
and all-one matrix, respectively. We show that for all adversary matrices Γi for Gi of the form
Γi = (1γ − Iγ)⊗ Si, where Si is a σ × σ symmetric matrix,
ADV±(H) > ADV±(F) min
i∈[β]
ADV±(Gi; Γi). (1)
To prove this, we define an adversary matrix ΓH for H and compute its spectrum. It suffices to
compute the largest eigenvalues of ΓH and ΓH •Dq to give our lower bound on ADV±(H).
Let us introduce some notation that we will use throughout the proof. Inputs to H are written
x, y ∈ P β. Each x ∈ P β breaks into x = (x1, . . . , xβ). The result of applying the inner functions
to x = (x1, . . . , xβ) is written x˜ = (x˜1, . . . , x˜β) = (G1(x1), . . . ,Gβ(xβ)). Each xi ∈ P , seen as an
element of (A′)σ, also breaks down into its components, which we write xi = ((xi)1, . . . , (xi)σ),
where each component (xi)j is an element of A
′.
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Γi =


0 Si · · · Si
Si 0
. . . Si
...
. . .
. . .
...
Si Si · · · 0

 Dq =


∆′q ∆q · · · ∆q
∆q ∆
′
q
. . . ∆q
...
. . .
. . .
...
∆q ∆q · · · ∆′q


Figure 1: The matrices Γi and Dq are decomposed into blocks Γ
(x˜i,y˜i)
i and D
(x˜i,y˜i)
q , respectively.
Each block labelled x˜i, y˜i contains inputs xi (resp. yi) that map to the same output value,
that is, Gi(xi) = x˜i (resp. Gi(yi) = y˜i).
The structure on Γi allows us to consider it as γ× γ blocks, each of size σ×σ, as follows. Rows
and columns of Γi, indexed by inputs of the form xi = (a1, . . . , aσ) ∈ P , are sorted according to
the value x˜i = Gi(xi). The submatrix Γ
(x˜i,y˜i)
i is the restriction of Γi to the rows and columns such
that Gi(xi) = x˜i and Gi(yi) = y˜i. When Γi = (1γ − Iγ) ⊗ Si, the diagonal blocks are the all-zero
matrix and the others are equal to the matrix Si. See Figure 1.
We define ΓH on blocks labelled by (x˜, y˜) ∈ Aβ ×Aβ. The submatrix Γ(x˜,y˜)H is the restric-
tion of ΓH to the rows and columns indexed by x = (x1, . . . , xβ), y = (y1, . . . , yβ) ∈ P β such that
(G1(x1), . . . ,Gβ(xβ)) = x˜ and (G1(y1), . . . ,Gβ(yβ)) = y˜:
Γ
(x˜,y˜)
H
= ΓF[x˜, y˜] ·
(
β⊗
i=1
Γ
(x˜i,y˜i)
i
)
. (2)
Here, ΓF is an adversary matrix for F and instead of Γi, we have used the modified adversary
matrices
Γi = Γi + ‖Si‖Iγσ ,
which add ‖Si‖ to the diagonal, to prevent zeroing out the block of H when x˜i equals y˜i on one of
its components. The fundamental property of ΓH is that its norm is the product of the norms of
the matrices ΓF and Si.
Claim 1. For the matrix ΓH defined as above, ‖ΓH‖ = ‖ΓF‖ ·
∏β
i=1 ‖Si‖.
We defer the proof of this claim and first see how it implies Equation 1. Claim 1 gives us the
norm of ΓH, and it remains to compute maxℓ ‖ΓH •Dℓ‖ (Definition 4). Let us turn to the matrix
ΓH •Dℓ to see that it shares the structure of ΓH so we can also apply Claim 1 to compute its norm.
Recall that the domain of H is P β , where P ⊆ (A′)σ. An index ℓ into an input x to H decomposes
into p ∈ [β], an index within x, and the index q ∈ [σ] within xp seen as a vector in (A′)σ.
Claim 2. ‖ΓH •Dℓ‖ = ‖ΓF •Dp‖ · ‖Sp •∆q‖ ·
∏
i 6=p ‖Si‖.
Proof of Claim 2. Restricting to the block labelled by x˜ and y˜, Ref. [14] shows that
(ΓH •Dℓ)(x˜,y˜) = (ΓF •Dp)[x˜, y˜] · (Γp •Dq)(x˜p,y˜p) ⊗

⊗
i 6=p
Γ
(x˜i,y˜i)
i

 . (3)
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Here we use the second property of pSEARCH: for each q, there exist matrices ∆q and ∆
′
q such
that when restricted to blocks, Dq = (1γ − Iγ)⊗∆q+ Iγ∆′q. Therefore, Γp •Dq has the same block
structure as Γp and by Claim 1, we get the expression for ‖ΓH •Dℓ‖ given in Claim 2.
Equation 1 follows from Claims 1 and 2.
ADV±(H; ΓH) = min
p,q
‖ΓF‖
‖ΓF •Dp‖
∏β
i=1 ‖Si‖
‖Sp •∆q‖ ·
∏
i 6=p ‖Si‖
= min
p,q
‖ΓF‖
‖ΓF •Dp‖
‖Sp‖ ·
∏
i 6=p ‖Si‖
‖Sp •∆q‖ ·
∏
i 6=p ‖Si‖
= min
p,q
‖ΓF‖
‖ΓF •Dp‖
‖Sp‖
‖Sp •∆q‖
> min
p
( ‖ΓF‖
‖ΓF •Dp‖ minq
‖Sp‖
‖Sp •∆q‖
)
.
Using ‖Γi‖ = (γ − 1)‖Si‖ and ‖Γi •Dp‖ = (γ − 1)‖Si •∆p‖, it follows that
ADV±(Gp; Γp) = min
q
‖Sp‖
‖Sp •∆q‖ , (4)
and therefore
ADV±(H; ΓH) > ADV±(F) ·min
q
ADV±(Gq; Γq) .
Proof of Claim 1. We first prove ‖ΓH‖ 6 ‖ΓF‖ ·
∏
i ‖Si‖. The proof proceeds in four steps.
1. We define a set of vectors {δα,c} in C(σγ)β .
2. We prove that they are eigenvectors of ΓH and give the corresponding eigenvalues.
3. We show that we have defined all eigenvectors and eigenvalues of ΓH.
4. We upper bound the eigenvalues in absolute value.
Similarly to the way we built up ΓH from ΓF and the Γi, we construct eigenvectors for ΓH using
the eigenvectors for ΓF and the Si as building blocks. We need some more notation before starting
the proof. The spectrum of Si is {(δi,j , λi,j)} with eigenvalues |λi,1| > · · · > |λi,σ|. For x˜i, y˜i ∈ A,
we use the following notation:
λx˜i 6=y˜ii,j =


λi,j if x˜i 6= y˜i
‖Si‖ otherwise.
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As we can see from the following eigenvalue equation, λx˜i 6=y˜ii,j is the eigenvalue of Γ
(x˜i,y˜i)
i associated
with the vector δi,j:
Γ
(x˜i,y˜i)
i δi,j =


λi,jδi,j if x˜i 6= y˜i
‖Si‖δi,j otherwise
= λx˜i 6=y˜ii,j δi,j . (5)
Given a vector of indices c = (c1, . . . , cβ), ci ∈ [σ], we build up our eigenvectors for ΓH by picking
the ci
th eigenvector for the ith inner function (see Step 1). For c = (c1, . . . , cβ), the γ
β × γβ matrix
Ac is defined by blocks
Ac[x˜, y˜] = ΓF[x˜, y˜] ·
β∏
i=1
λx˜i 6=y˜ii,ci
and we write its spectrum
{(α, µα,c)} .
Step 1: We are ready to define the eigenvectors δα,c of ΓH. We define the vectors δα,c on the
block δ
(x˜)
α,c of coordinates x ∈ P β such that (G1(x1), . . . ,Gβ(xβ)) = x˜:
δ(x˜)α,c = α[x˜] ·
(
β⊗
i=1
δi,ci
)
. (6)
Notice that because of the structure of the Γi, it suffices for our purposes to build up the eigenvectors
of ΓH from the eigenvectors of the underlying Si, which considerably simplifies the proof.
Step 2: We claim that the δα,c are eigenvectors of ΓH with corresponding eigenvalues µα,c.
We want to calculate ΓHδα,c. We do this block by block. Fix x˜ ∈ Aβ . Using the eigenvalue
equation (5), we get
β⊗
i=1
Γ
(x˜i,y˜i)
i
β⊗
i=1
δi,ci =
β∏
i=1
λx˜i 6=y˜ii,ci
β⊗
i=1
δi,ci . (7)
Then, by Equations (2) and (6),
(ΓHδα,c)
(x˜) =
∑
y˜
(
ΓF[x˜, y˜] ·
⊗
i
Γ
(x˜i,y˜i)
i
)(
α[y˜] ·
⊗
i
δi,ci
)
=
∑
y˜
ΓF[x˜, y˜]α[y˜] ·
∏
i
λx˜i 6=y˜ii,ci ·
⊗
i
δi,ci (by Equation 7)
=
∑
y˜
A(x˜,y˜)c α[y˜] ·
⊗
i
δi,ci
= µα,c α[x˜] ·
⊗
i
δi,ci
= µα,c δα,c .
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Step 3: We prove that the vectors δα,c span C
(σγ)β . There are σβ matrices Ac, and each one has
γβ eigenvectors α. Therefore, {δα,c} is a collection of (σγ)β vectors. We now prove that they are
orthogonal. Notice that
〈δα,c, δα′,c′〉 =
∑
x˜
〈δ(x˜)α,c, δ(x˜)α′,c′〉
=
∑
x˜
(
α[x˜]α′[x˜] ·
β∏
i=1
〈δi,ci , δi,c′i〉
)
= 〈α,α′〉 ·
β∏
i=1
〈δi,ci , δi,c′i〉 .
If δα,c 6= δα′,c′ , it must be the case that either c 6= c′ or α 6= α′. Assume c 6= c′. Then for some i,
δi,ci 6= δi,c′i and since these vectors form an orthonormal basis of Cσ, we get 〈δi,ci , δi,c′i〉 = 0. Now if
c = c′, then α 6= α′. Again, these vectors form an orthonormal basis of Cγβ and we get 〈α,α′〉 = 0.
Step 4: We prove by induction that the eigenvalues µα,c of ΓH are such that |µα,c| 6 ‖ΓF‖·
∏
i ‖Si‖
for all α and c. For i ∈ [β] and c ∈ [σ]β , we define a family of matrices A(i)c recursively as follows:
1. A
(0)
c = ΓF,
2. A
(i)
c [x˜, y˜] = A
(i−1)
c [x˜, y˜] · λx˜i 6=y˜ii,ci .
By definition, A
(β)
c = Ac. We prove by induction that for each i,
‖A(i)c ‖ 6 ‖ΓF‖ ·
i∏
j=1
‖Sj‖ .
Since µα,c is an eigenvalue of Ac, this implies |µα,c| 6 ‖Ac‖ 6 ‖ΓF‖ ·
∏
i ‖Si‖.
Since A
(0)
c = ΓF, the base case is trivial. Assume that for some i, ‖A(i−1)c ‖ 6 ‖ΓF‖ ·
∏i−1
j=1 ‖Sj‖.
By rearranging the rows and columns of A
(i−1)
c as before, we can consider that it is formed of γ2
blocks with the following structure: the block labelled (u, v) ∈ A×A contains the entries A(i−1)c [x˜, y˜]
such that x˜i = u and y˜i = v. Now, to form A
(i)
c , the diagonal blocks of A
(i−1)
c , labelled (u, u), are
multiplied by ‖Si‖ and the others are multiplied by the same factor λi,ci , which is at most ‖Si‖.
We claim that under this operation, the norm of the matrix increases at most by a factor ‖Si‖.
Define B = 1|λi,ci |
A
(i)
c −A(i−1)c . This block diagonal matrix contains the diagonal blocks of A(i−1)c
multiplied by τi =
1
|λi,ci |
‖Si‖ − 1, while the other blocks are set to 0. In other words, B is a direct
sum of operators acting on disjoint subspaces E1, . . . , Eγ . It follows that
1. any eigenvalue of B is associated with an eigenvector whose support is in Et for some t, and
2. for any vector v whose support is in Et for some t, ‖Bv‖ 6 ‖τiA(i−1)c v‖.
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This implies ‖B‖ 6 τi‖A(i−1)c ‖. Finally, writing A(i)c = |λi,ci |(A(i−1)c +B), we have
‖A(i)c ‖ 6 |λi,ci |(‖A(i−1)c ‖+ ‖B‖)
6 |λi,ci |(1 + |τi|)‖A(i−1)c ‖.
Since λi,ci is an eigenvalue of Si, it is the case that τi > 0, so 1 + |τi| = 1|λi,ci |‖Si‖. Finally,
‖A(i)c ‖ 6 ‖Si‖ · ‖A(i−1)c ‖ .
The induction hypothesis allows us to conclude the proof of Step 4, which completes one direc-
tion in the proof of Claim 1.
We now prove the other direction: ‖ΓH‖ > ‖ΓF‖ ·
∏
i ‖Γi‖. Taking c = (1, . . . , 1), we
have ‖ΓH‖ > ‖Ac‖. By definition, Ac[x˜, y˜] = ΓF[x˜, y˜] ·
∏
i ‖Si‖, which immediately implies that
‖ΓH‖ > ‖ΓF‖ ·
∏
i ‖Si‖. This completes the proof of Claim 1.
To complete the proof of Theorem 13, we choose Si = 1σ and take Γi = (1γ − Iγ) ⊗ 1σ for
the adversary matrix of Gi = pSEARCH, for each i. We verify that Dq has the necessary block
structure. Indeed, for each output pair a, b of pSEARCH, if a 6= b then the block is all zero except
in the row and column indexed by q, where it is 1, since the qth row corresponds to the input where
a is hidden in position q and the qth column is the input where b is hidden in position q. Further,
if a = b then the block in Dq is 1 in column q and row q except in position (q, q) where it is zero.
By direct computation, ‖Si‖ = σ and ‖Si • ∆q‖ =
√
σ − 1. Using Definition 4 and Equation 4
(with Gi = pSEARCH), it follows that
ADV±(pSEARCH) > ADV±(pSEARCH; Γi) = min
q
‖Si‖
‖Si •∆q‖ =
σ√
σ − 1 >
√
σ . (8)
On the other hand, we know from the universality (up to a factor 2) of the generalized adversary
bound [15] and Ref. [6] that
ADV±(pSEARCH)/2 6 Q(pSEARCH) 6
π
4
√
σ , (9)
where Q denotes the quantum query complexity. Equations 8 and 9 imply that
ADV±(pSEARCH; Γi) >
2
π
ADV±(pSEARCH) .
Theorem 13 now follows from Equation 1.
Proof of Lemma 5. Lemma 5 follows by using the quantum query complexity lower bounds for
pSEARCH, which is Ω(σ1/2), and the quantum query complexity of FR.
29
8 Conclusion and Open Questions
We presented two sequences of protocols Qk and Ck for k > 2 with the following properties. In pro-
tocol Qk, a classical Alice establishes a key with a quantum Bob after O(N) queries to two black-box
random functions, which can be modelled by a single binary random oracle. We proved that the best
possible quantum eavesdropping strategy requires Θ
(
N1+
k
k+1
)
queries to the same black-box func-
tions. In protocol Ck, purely classical Alice and Bob can establish a key with O(N) queries to two
similar black-box functions. This time, the best possible quantum eavesdropping strategy requires
Θ
(
N
1
2
+ k
k+1
)
queries to the functions. Our optimal attacks proceed by quantum walks in Hamming
graphs and our proofs of optimality make use of a new lower-bound composition theorem of inde-
pendent interest. Our quantum protocols can be modified to avoid the need for quantum memories
in case this is considered technologically too challenging or fundamentally objectionable [21].
It follows that key establishment protocols a` la Merkle can be nearly as secure in our quantum
world as they were thought to be in the whimsical classical world known to Merkle in 1974: arbi-
trarily close to quadratic security can be restored. It would be interesting to find a quantum
protocol that exactly achieves quadratic security. . . or better! Indeed, even though it has been
proved in the classical case that quadratic security is the best that can be achieved [2], there is no
compelling evidence yet that such a limitation exists in the quantum world.
Perhaps more interestingly in the short term, while quantum computers are not yet available
(but who knows?), secret messages must nevertheless be transmitted in confidence that they will
not become retroactively compromised as soon as a quantum computer is built. In this realistic
context, Alice and Bob can use our classical protocols today to establish a key whose security, even
against a future quantum eavesdropper, remains as good (in the limit) as what was known to be
possible for quantum Alice and Bob before this work [9]. The main open question would be to
break the N3/2 barrier for classical-against-quantum protocols, or prove that this is not possible.
Even though our protocols Qk and Ck require classical Alice to make only O(N) queries to the
black-box functions, she has to work for a time in Θ
(
N ⌈k/2⌉
)
to complete her share of the protocol
with the best classical algorithms currently known, which is more than linear when k > 3. Could
protocols exist in which Alice would be efficient also from a time perspective? If we have to limit
ourselves to k = 2 when both Alice and Bob are classical, the security of C2 against a quantum
eavesdropper is merely Ω
(
N7/6
)
. In the case of a quantum Alice, we have an algorithm that runs in
linear expected time (neglecting logarithmic factors) for the case k = 3 as well, yielding a protocol
in which quantum Alice and Bob work for a time and number of queries proportional to N , yet
a quantum eavesdropper must expend an effort proportional to N7/4 to be privy to their secret.
This last protocol, however, requires Alice to make use of a quantum memory.
Our lower bounds prove that it is not possible for an eavesdropper to learn Alice and Bob’s
key, except with vanishing probability, without querying the black-box functions significantly more
than the legitimate parties. However, we have not addressed the possibility for the eavesdropper
to obtain efficiently useful partial information about the key. We leave this important issue for
further research.
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